2019-10-16 14:01 |
The Stellar Development Foundation recently released a proposal to remove inflation rewards from the network at the end of the month. A validator vote is scheduled for Monday, October 28th. origin »
Stellar (XLM) на Currencies.ru
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2019-10-16 14:01 |
The Stellar Development Foundation recently released a proposal to remove inflation rewards from the network at the end of the month. A validator vote is scheduled for Monday, October 28th. origin »
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DAO. Casino Blockchain, a blockchain startup that aims to revolutionize the gambling industry, announces the release of its Test Net 2. 0. The Test Net 2. 0 introduces an optimized governance model and several new features, which includes the dynamic validator allocation and dedicated mechanism of vote staking.
2019-8-7 20:58 | |
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DAO. Casino is releasing TestNet 2. 0, which comes with a range of new features and improvements on the previous version. Particular highlights include a streamlined governance model, dedicated vote staking mechanism, and effective voter allocation.
2019-8-6 23:56 | |
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DAO. Casino is delighted to announce the release of the DAO. Casino Blockchain TestNet 2. 0. The given update is intended to present our new features and improved governance model, including the dedicated vote staking mechanism and dynamic validator allocation.
2019-8-5 15:30 | |
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In order to help more people understand “the other Casper” (Vlad Zamfir’s CBC Casper), and specifically the instantiation that works best for blockchain protocols, I thought that I would write an explainer on it myself, from a less abstract and more “close to concrete usage” point of view.
2018-12-6 04:03 | |
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Coin holder voting, both for governance of technical features, and for more extensive use cases like deciding who runs validator nodes and who receives money from development bounty funds, is unfortunately continuing to be popular, and so it seems worthwhile for me to write another post explaining why I (and Vlad Zamfir and others) do not consider it wise for Ethereum (or really, any base-layer blockchain) to start adopting these kinds of mechanisms in a tightly coupled form in any significant way.
2018-7-21 23:03 | |
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In which I argue that “tightly coupled” on-chain voting is overrated, the status quo of “informal governance” as practiced by Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, Ethereum, Zcash and similar systems is much less bad than commonly thought, that people who think that the purpose of blockchains is to completely expunge soft mushy human intuitions and feelings in favor of completely algorithmic governance (emphasis on “completely”) are absolutely crazy, and loosely coupled voting as done by Carbonvotes and similar systems is underrated, as well as describe what framework should be used when thinking about blockchain governance in the first place.
2018-7-21 23:03 | |
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